On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions by unknown
On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions
Matthew Tugby1
Received: 13 April 2015 /Accepted: 3 April 2016 /
Published online: 30 April 2016
# The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Recently, Choi (Noûs, 46, 289–325, 2012) has argued that current accounts
of intrinsically finkable dispositions lead to absurd consequences in certain everyday
cases. In this paper I offer a new argument for the existence of intrinsically finkable
dispositions, one which provides a new way of testing for the presence of such
dispositions. It is then argued that, with this new test in place, Choi’s examples no
longer present a problem for the view that some dispositions are intrinsically finkable.
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Introduction
In contemporary metaphysics, few deny that dispositions can truly be ascribed to
things. But there are still cases in which it is unclear as to whether a thing has a certain
disposition. For example, it has been questioned whether there can be intrinsically
finkable dispositions (the notion of finkablity will be explained below). And as Choi
points out (Choi 2012, p. 289), this is an important question, as it affects issues in a
variety of philosophical topics. On one side of the debate are those who favour analyses
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Choi 2005, 2012; Handfield 2008 and Handfield and Bird 2008). In contrast others
have happily accepted that there can be intrinsically finkable dispositions (e.g. Clarke
2008, 2010 and Fara 2008).
In a recent paper, Choi (2012) has defended his rejection of intrinsically finkable
dispositions (henceforth ‘IF dispositions’) against the opposing views of Clarke and
Fara.1 After showing that his analysis of dispositions entails that IF dispositions are
impossible, Choi argues that the sort of reasoning that leads Clarke and others to accept
the possibility of IF dispositions will lead them to ascribe absurd dispositions in certain
everyday cases. I largely agree with Choi’s assessment. But all is not lost for the
defender of IF dispositions. In this paper I offer new reasons for thinking there can be
IF dispositions, reasons which suggest a new criterion for identifying such dispositions.2
I then argue that this new criterion delivers the correct verdicts in Choi’s problem cases.
But before presenting the core arguments, we must first explain in more detail the notion
of finkability.
Finkable Dispositions
The notion of a fink was first introduced by C.B. Martin (1994, p.2) and refers to a
factor which causes a disposition to be lost as soon as it is triggered, thereby preventing
the disposition’s manifestation from coming about. Martin’s original example of a fink,
known as the electro-fink case, is one in which the finking factor is extrinsic to the
object whose disposition is frustrated. In the 'reverse' electro-fink case (Martin 1994,
p.3), the fink is an external machine that detects when a live wire comes into contact
with a conductor. The instant at which such contact occurs, the fink causes the wire to
become dead, so that the flow of electricity is prevented. Here, then, we have a case in
which the wire plausibly has a certain disposition even though the associated manifes-
tation is prevented by an extrinsic interferer.
Now, given that metaphysicians have invariably accepted that there can be extrin-
sically finkable dispositions, one would naturally assume we should accept cases in
which the finking factor happens to be intrinsic to the thing with that disposition. And
indeed, people like Clarke (2008) and Fara (2008) have happily accepted the possibility
of IF dispositions. In reconstructing the sort of reasoning that people like Clarke
employ, Choi (2012, pp. 305-306) explains that the acceptance of IF dispositions is
typically driven by two observations. The first observation is that in alleged cases of IF
dispositions, the object in question has a part that we would typically agree confers the
disposition in question. For instance, although someone may fail to lift heavy things
due to a certain intrinsic property, if they had the same muscular structure as people
1 Choi (2010, p. 585) also relies on his rejection of intrinsic finks in his response to Lee (2010), who criticizes
Choi’s simple conditional analysis of dispositions.
2 After this paper was submitted for review at this journal, a paper by Kittle (2015) appeared elsewhere which
has similar broad aims. That is, Kittle responds to critics of intrinsically finkable dispositions like Choi by
trying to draw a principled distinction between cases which do involve genuine intrinsically finkable
dispositions and those which do not. However, Kittle’s strategy is very different to mine, for it involves
appealing to considerations about the role of ‘circumstances’ surrounding the stimulus and manifestation of a
putative disposition (2015, p. 374) and also the ‘modal strength’ of dispositions (2015, p. 379). Clearly, if
Kittle’s arguments succeed in strengthening further the case for intrinsically finkable dispositions, then I would
welcome this.
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who are clearly strong, this could provide a reason for thinking the person in question is
also strong (Clarke 2008, p. 513). The second observation is that because intrinsic finks
play the same kinds of causal roles as extrinsic finks, and we are all happy to accept the
existence of extrinsically finkable dispositions, we should therefore accept, for reasons
of parity, that there can be IF dispositions.
But as indicated above, the problem is that, as Choi shows, this sort of reasoning
arguably leads to the ascription of absurd dispositions in certain everyday cases. Does
this mean that the reasoning just outlined is seriously mistaken? I do not think so. Both
reasons above are an important part of the story about why we should be willing to
ascribe IF dispositions in certain cases. But it is not the whole story. In the next section,
I will provide a new argument in favour of IF dispositions, one which suggests a new
way of testing for the presence of an intrinsically finkable disposition.
In Support of intrinsically Finkable Dispositions
The imaginary but physically possible case that I will use for illustrative purposes is as
follows. Imagine a robot that has enough electrical charge running through its body to
kill any living being that touches it, as long as its battery remains connected upon
contact. Imagine further, however, that at any moment at which the robot is touched by
a living being, the battery is automatically disconnected by the robot’s charge modu-
lator. Because of the robot’s modulator, it is safe for people to touch the robot even
though it may seem natural (given the presence of the charged battery) to suppose that
the robot has the disposition to electrocute. If this natural supposition is correct, then
this is a case of a disposition which is susceptible to an intrinsic fink. I will call this
robot ‘Batfink’.
It is, I suggest, problematic to deny that Batfink has the disposition to electrocute.
An initial cause of unease, of a kind that has been highlighted by Ashwell (2010, p.
649), is that the denial appears to make the preventative behaviour redundant. If Batfink
is to avoid endangering human life, then it seems that a shut-down mechanism is indeed
needed. Yet if it is not really the case that Batfink has the disposition to electrocute, why
should the battery have to be disconnected in order to prevent living beings from
frazzling? Unfortunately, however, there is an obvious move for the denier of IF
dispositions to make. They can accept that the disconnection of the battery upon
contact is necessary for the protection of life, but maintain that this is not
because Batfink has the disposition to electrocute. Rather, it is necessary
because if the modulator were not present, then Batfink would gain the
disposition to electrocute. That is, were the features responsible for the inter-
vention to be removed, a new disposition would come into existence, which
explains why the preventative behaviour is necessary.
It is at this point, however, that the problems start for the deniers of IF dispositions.
This is because they must then explain which of the features gained by Batfink during
the modulator’s removal are the ones that plausibly constitute, or at least partially
constitute (in conjunction, perhaps, with properties Batfink already has), the new
disposition to electrocute. This is an extremely important issue, because if none of
the features that Batfink already had before the modulator’s removal are ones that gave
Batfink the disposition to electrocute, then it had better be the case that by removing the
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modulator, Batfink is given a new property or properties of the sort that can plausibly
constitute, or at least partially constitute, the disposition to electrocute. If there are no
such properties, then the existence of the new electrocution disposition would look
mysterious. In that case, it would surely be better to say that the disposition was there
all along, but that it was being finked.
The problem for the opponent of IF dispositions is that Batfink may not undergo any
positive changes upon the removal of the modulator. Let us stipulate that Batfink’s
modulator is easily detachable and so can be physically removed from Batfink without
otherwise affecting its internal constitution or essential functions. In that case, what new
properties are there that could explain Batfink’s new disposition to electrocute? If
Batfink gains no positive properties upon the modulator’s removal, then there are only
two possible kinds of property that Batfink could be said to gain: a new negative
property or a new totality property, as will now be explained.
Let us begin by considering the state of play if all Batfink can be said to gain is a
purely negative property, namely, the property of lacking a charge modulator. Negative
properties are to be contrasted with positive properties because, unlike positive prop-
erties, negative properties concern only features that are absent from a thing. Is it
plausible that negative properties could plausibly constitute, or at least partially con-
stitute, an entirely new disposition?
Unfortunately for opponents of IF dispositions, it seems not, for as Armstrong
(2004, p. 55), Molnar (2000, pp.77-9) and others have argued, it is hard to see how
negative properties could constitute the causal grounds of dispositions. Dispositions, to
recall, are taken by the participants in the fink debates to be genuine features of things.
They are either taken to be irreducible entities in their own right or on more deflationist
views they are identified with a categorical base. But on either view, dispositions are
grounded in the concrete, spatiotemporally instantiated properties of things, properties
which make a causal impact on the world. Negative properties, in contrast, concern
what is not spatiotemporally instantiated. But for this reason, they are unsuitable
candidates for conferrers of dispositions. A view which sees absences as somehow
dictating how certain concrete things are disposed to behave looks very mysterious.
It should be conceded that we do sometimes appeal to absences when giving loose,
everyday explanations for behavioural tendencies. For example, Molnar, who puts
forward the sort of argument just outlined, concedes that not all causal explanations
concern what is operative (Molnar 2003, pp. 77–9). When providing causal explana-
tions, it is appropriate in certain contexts to contrast the explanandum with certain other
events, and in constructing these contrastive explanations it can be natural to appeal to
facts about absences. But if what we require is an account of what, strictly speaking,
causally grounds the disposition to electrocute, as we currently do, then the ‘absence of
modulator’ explanation is not sufficient. For, as we saw above, surely it is only the
positive features of things that are able to do the world’s causal work.3
In short, if we take it that the only difference arising in Batfink upon the modulator’s
removal is the acquisition of a negative property, then we are unable to identify a
3 If there is any remaining doubt that it is only the positive properties of the world which are causally potent,
we may also allude to the fact that the physical causal laws in science invariably involve properties which are
wholly positive in nature. In fact, Armstrong takes this to be a good reason for naturalists like himself to deny
that negative properties (or what he calls negative ‘universals’) are genuine natural properties at all.
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plausible source for the new disposition to electrocute. In that case, it is surely better to
say that the disposition was there all along, conferred by the parts of Batfink we would
ordinarily associate with that disposition, such as the battery supply.
This is not quite the end of the matter, however, because it is not wholly clear that
Batfink would acquire only the purely negative property of lacking a charge modulator.
It could be argued that once the charge modulator is removed, what Batfink gains is, to
be precise, a new overall mass, for example, and a new overall internal structure.
Although, after the alteration, we are not left with any internal structure that was not
there before, it could be argued that Batfink has a new total structure, given that the
former total structure included the modulator.4 States of affairs like these are cases that
Armstrong (2004, pp. 61-2) calls totality or limiting states of affairs. They are limiting
in that they involve a thing having properties to a certain degree and nothing more.5
One might notice, however, that the limiting ‘and nothing more’ clause has a distinctly
negative flavour, which might make us wonder whether totality properties are just
negative properties by another name (see e.g. Armstrong 1997, pp.200–201, who
remarks that totality states of affairs clearly involve a relation to what is not). But as
mentioned above, the overall-internal-structure property is at least partially about the
positive internal structure that Batfink has, and so totality features seem not to be
wholly negative, even though they do have a negative aspect to them.
Unfortunately for the deniers of IF dispositions, however, it is hard to see how the
totality properties that remain upon the removal of the modulator in the Batfink case are
of a sort that could plausibly confer a new disposition which was not already there.
Crucially, given that the positive components of the relevant totality facts (concerning
Batfink’s internal structure, say) were already present before the modulator’s removal,
and given that it is denied that the disposition to electrocute is conferred until the
removal of the modulator, then it will have to be the negative aspect of the totality fact
which serves to confer, at least in part, the new disposition to electrocute. But as we
saw earlier, a negative feature cannot plausibly endow a thing with new dispositions,
even partially, given that they are concerned only with what is not spatiotemporally
instantiated in the thing. In short, in order for new totality features to confer new
dispositions, it would have to be the case that the relevant totality properties involve at
least some new positive features which were not there before. But this is not so in the
Batfink case, given the way it has been set up. At this point, then, a much neater story
presents itself, which is that Batfink’s disposition to electrocute was there all along,
conferred by the parts of Batfink we would ordinarily associate with such a disposition,
such as the battery supply.
Now, if all of the above insights are generalized, we are clearly led to a new way of
testing for the presence of an IF disposition. This criterion involves two conditions, the
joint satisfaction of which is sufficient to show there is an IF disposition in a given case.
The conditions are:
4 Handfield (2008) is one who I think would appeal to changes in totality properties in order to explain the
alleged appearance of the new disposition. In one place, for instance, he suggests that dispositions are
determined by the ‘total complement of supervenience base properties’ (2008, p. 302).
5 Compare Batfink’s having a certain internal structure and nothing more with the state of affairs, discussed by
Armstrong (2004, pp. 61-2), of a methane molecule having a structure involving five atoms and that is all.
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IF CONDITION 1: The object has a part which we would ordinarily think confers
the disposition in question.
IF CONDITION 2: The alleged intrinsic fink can be physically removed without
otherwise making any positive alterations to the object in question.6
With this new criterion in play, let us finally consider how they deal with the
everyday problem cases Choi presents for proponents of IF dispositions.
Choi’s Counterexamples: Birds, Aluminium and Bricks
As indicated earlier, Choi argues that the standard reasons for accepting IF
dispositions will lead us to ascribe strange dispositions in certain everyday cases.
That they are everyday cases is important, for as Choi points out (Choi 2012, p.
303), we often do not have very clear intuitions about the dispositions involved in
artificial cases, such as Clarke’s case of finkable human strength (Clarke 2008, p.
513) or the case of the shy chameleon (Clarke 2008, p. 513). Before showing how
the new criterion proposed can deal with Choi’s counterexamples, it should also
be noted that, as Choi highlights (Choi 2012, p. 306), strictly speaking his
counterexamples involve masks rather than finks.7 But given that proponents of
IF dispositions invariably accept intrinsically maskable dispositions for the same
reasons as IF dispositions, Choi’s counterexamples still serve their intended
purpose.
The Flying Bird
Before examining the two cases which I agree create problems for Clarke and Fara, let
us first set aside a case which I think is intuitively less compelling. The case in question
involves a flying bird weighing n pounds. Given that, ordinarily, an object weighing n
pounds would be disposed to fall down (when, say, released from a certain height), this
suggests that by the reasoning Choi attributes to Clarke, Clarke should say that the
flying bird also has the disposition to fall down, but that the wings act as an intrinsic
antidote to that disposition. But according to Choi, ‘there is no doubt that the bird is not
disposed to fall down’ (Choi 2012, p. 308). If Choi’s intuition is correct, then this
would clearly be a problem for both Clarke and the account of IF dispositions offered
above. Regarding the latter, one could surely remove the bird’s wings without other-
wise altering its positive properties, in which case IF condition 2 (as well as condition
1) is clearly satisfied. In response, however, I can only report that Choi’s assessment in
this particular case strikes me as being straightforwardly mistaken, and that intuitively
the bird does indeed have the disposition to fall down. I would urge Choi to reflect on
the fact that, since the flying bird has to constantly work hard to keep itself in the air, it
6 If the alledged fink satisfies this condition, then it would be classed as a ‘destructive interferer’ as defined by
Contessa (2013, p. 407). Given that Contessa’s analysis of dispositions classifies cases of destructive
interference as genuine cases of finkishness, the arguments of this paper lend support to the sort of analysis
of dispositions he offers as opposed to that offered by Choi (2012, p. 291).
7 In masking cases, the putative disposition is not removed when the triggering circumstances occur as they do
in finkish cases, but nonetheless the expected manifestation is blocked by the masking factor (the ‘antidote’).
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is surely proper to say that the bird is disposed to fall down in some sense.8 Of course,
we might change our assessment of the case for theoretical reasons, but if we are just
going by intuition, as Choi is, then this case is far less compelling than the two problem
cases now to be discussed.9
Aluminium
Let us now move on to a better example from Choi. Is aluminium disposed to rust, Choi
asks (Choi 2012, p. 306)? Intuitively, it is not, according to Choi, because when
exposed to oxygen, aluminium produces a dense skin of aluminium oxide which
immediately protects it from the levels of oxidation that would be necessary for it to
form a reddish-brown residue (i.e. rust). However, because aluminium has the same
kind of microstructure as metals which clearly do have the disposition to rust, it seems,
prima facie, that proponents of IF dispositions like Clarke should conclude that
aluminium does have the disposition to rust. I agree with Choi’s intuition that alumin-
ium does not have the disposition to rust. But the analysis proposed earlier is able to
deliver the correct verdict in this case. Recall that on this analysis, IF condition 2 tells
us that it is important that the putative intrinsic fink can be physically removed without
otherwise making any positive alterations to the thing in question. But this condition
cannot plausibly be satisfied in the aluminium case, and so we can agree that it does not
have the disposition to rust. The problem is that aluminium, by its very nature will
always create a think protective film when oxidised. If some substance did not create a
film of aluminium oxide upon oxidation, then that substance would not be aluminium.
What is the relevance if this? Well, it means that the only way in which we can
eliminate aluminium’s protective behaviour is to transform it into some other substance.
And that will inevitably leave us with something that has new positive chemical
properties and internal structure. For instance, we could eliminate aluminium’s protec-
tive behaviour by creating an alloy from it. It is well known that aluminium alloy, as
opposed to pure aluminium, offers little protection against corrosion. But aluminium
alloy has very different positive properties from pure aluminium. For instance, although
copper and aluminium are both relatively soft metals, an alloy combining the two is
much harder and stronger.
Before moving on, it is important to note that it would perhaps be harmless enough
to say that a lump of aluminium has the capability to gain the disposition rust, were
certain positive, substantial changes to be brought about. What this suggests is that we
8 This means that, intuitively, the bird has opposing dispositions: the disposition to fly and the disposition to
fall down (though of course only one of these dispositions can be manifested at a given time). But I agree with
Clarke that there is nothing problematic about things having opposing dispositions. See Clarke 2010.
9 Incidentally, I would say the same about the lactose case which is discussed by Handfield and Bird (2008),
and which Choi briefly alludes to (2012, p. 308). According to Handfield and Bird (2008, p. 291) it would be
absurd to say that most people have the disposition to be poisoned by milk when ingested, given that lactase is
usually present in their bodies. However, as with the bird case, it is less clear to me that it would be absurd to
ascribe such a disposition in this case. Furthermore, even if we agree with Handfield and Bird that the presence
of lactase in a person is an intrinsic feature of the person (which may itself be questionable), surely the lactase
is an extrinsic antidote relative to the milk that is ingested. Hence, if we allow dispositions which can be
extrinsically finked/antidoted, Handfield and Bird’s verdict seems to leave us with an odd asymmetry: the milk
is disposed to poison the person when ingested but that same person is not disposed to be poisoned by the milk
when ingested.
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should be careful to distinguish the notion of an intrinsically finkable or maskable
disposition from the notion once introduced by Shoemaker of a conditional power.
Shoemaker says, for example, that a knife-shaped piece of butter has the power to cut
wood conditionally upon being turned to steel, i.e., it has the conditional power to cut
wood (Shoemaker 2003, p. 212). In other words, the butter has the potential to gain the
ability to cut wood, given certain positive changes. The aluminium case is clearly more
analogous to this case than cases involving IF dispositions. Like aluminium, the butter
would have to undergo a positive change in order to gain the power to cut, for instance
by being being deep frozen or, to use Shoemaker’s own example, by (somehow)
becoming steel.
Importantly, this observation may help to explain why there has been hostility in
some quarters towards the idea of IF dispositions. The reason is that many of the cases
that a proponent of IF dispositions might initially suppose involve IF dispositions are in
fact more like cases of Shoemaker’s conditional powers, thereby creating confusion on
both sides. But I will not be able to explore this diagnosis further here.
The Brick
The final example to be discussed is one that Choi attributes to Fara’s work (Fara 2008,
p. 857). Does a brick have the disposition to roll down a hill, despite the fact that it is
rectangular? Clearly, the answer is ‘no’, yet one could perhaps conceive of a rectangular
brick as a spherical object whose disposition to roll is frustrated by the outer parts of the
brick (i.e. the parts that give it an overall rectangular shape). The danger facing
proponents of IF dispositions, then, is that they will have to accept that a rectangular
brick has the disposition to roll, which is absurd. In response, Fara (2008, p. 857)
argues that this case does not involve the disposition to roll because the putative
masking factor is a permanent feature of the brick. According to Fara’s analysis, we
should only ascribe intrinsically finkable/maskable dispositions in cases where the
finking/masking factors are temporary features of the things in question. But despite
this account’s initial promise, Choi argues that Fara’s criterion breaks down in modified
cases. Suppose, Choi says, that a brick regularly changes its shape—from being, say,
rectangular to being spherical (Choi 2012, p. 310). In such a case the overall shape of
the brick is a temporary rather than permanent feature of the brick and yet we still
would not want to say that, during the rectangular periods, the brick has the disposition
to roll.
Fortunately, however, the new criterion introduced earlier does arguably allow us to
deny that a rectangular brick has the disposition to roll. It should be conceded that IF
condition 2 is plausibly satisfied because the rectangular-making parts of the brick
could be physically removed (using a chisel, say) without otherwise bringing about any
positive changes. But recall IF condition 1, which requires that the thing has a part
which we would ordinarily think confers the disposition in question. Does the brick
really have a spherical part? I find it very strange to think that a rectangular brick has a
spherical part. At least, not if we are using our everyday notion of ‘part’.10 If we are to
10 I do not doubt that some metaphysical notion of part can be stipulated on which it is true to say that the brick
has a spherical part. But such a notion is far removed from the ordinary notion of a part in play in what are our
intuitive assessments of these cases.
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allow that the brick has a spherical part, then surely we could arbitrarily pick any of an
infinite number of shapes and say that it has a part with that shape. Again, I take it that
this would be a very unnatural thing to say. Perhaps we can conceive in thought of
many inner overlapping areas of the brick having a certain shape, by abstracting the rest
of the brick away. But these are purely divisions that are being created and projected in
the mind. It would be strange indeed to say that the homogenous brick really is divided
up in that way. I take it, for instance, that we would all agree that while (for example)
there is a definite sense in which a garden wall has brick-shaped parts, we would not
want to say that it also has spherical parts, star-shaped parts, dog-shaped parts,
butterfly-shaped parts, and any other arbitrarily shaped part we care to mention.
Conclusions
In this paper we have seen that Choi’s examples create a significant problem for
existing accounts of IF dispositions. I have, however, provided a new argument for
the existence of IF dispositions, one which delivers a new way of testing for the
presence of such dispositions With this new account in place, proponents of IF
dispositions can deliver intuitively correct verdicts in Choi’s examples. So, it is not
time, yet, to give up on the possibility of intrinsically finkable or maskable dispositions.
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